

X.—Criticisms of Isocrates and His φιλοσοφία

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From reading Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates himself, scholars have formed the impression that the sophists and rhetoricians of the fifth and fourth centuries, in so far as they taught oratory, tried to instruct their pupils in the art of making the worse cause appear to be the better cause and of gaining an unfair advantage over their opponents in the courts of law.¹ I have already² tried to show that both teachers and pupils in the fifth century had a conception of rhetoric very different from this, and thought that it was the best training for leadership in the state.³ If it is true that the early rhetoricians trained statesmen as well as litigants, then we must explain why some ancient writers try to convey the opposite impression.

Aristophanes' *Clouds* has been cited to prove that the sophists taught litigation primarily. This evidence probably should not be taken too seriously. Although Strepsiades went to school only in order to learn how to cheat his creditors, yet the cloudy divinities of the sophists offered to make him a famous statesman.⁴ Aristophanes misrepresents the sophists perhaps chiefly for comic effect.⁵

¹ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1402a23–26, equates Corax's technique with Protagoras' promise to convert the weaker argument into the stronger. Socrates, *Apol.* 19b, and Isocrates, 15.15, were similarly accused of perverting justice; cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 486f. Isocrates was also charged with teaching the art of litigation, 15.30. Plato absolutely disregards the deliberative uses of rhetoric in *Laws* 937e and *Epinomis* 976b.

² In "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," *HSCPh* 53 (1942) 121–155, I have discussed modern opinions on this point as well as the ancient evidence. A clear expression of the usual opinion appears in D. A. G. Hinks' "Tria Genera Causarum," *CQ* 30 (1936) 170.

³ Passages which seem to establish this thesis are collected from Plato and others in my article (note 2). For instance, Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1180a12–15, blames the sophists for considering politics the same as rhetoric or an inferior part of it. Xenophon, *Anab.* 2.6.16, says that Proxenus wished to become a man capable of dealing with great things and so gave money to Gorgias; afterwards he considered himself ready for rule and for friendship with the leaders of Greece.

⁴ Aristophanes' misrepresentation of the sophists is discussed in my paper (note 2), pp. 144f. For the *Clouds*' promise see lines 412–420 and 431–432. Cf. C. T. Murphy, "Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric," *HSCPh* 49 (1938) 74.

⁵ Only the comic poets were permitted to criticize the people at Athens according to Isocrates, 8.14. This suggests that the comedies were valued more for entertain-

The audience knew that sophists prided themselves on rich and aristocratic pupils and promised to teach them how to rule the people. So it was a good joke to belittle the politicians and their teachers by making a Socrates try to teach a poor stupid farmer how to defraud his petty creditors. This appealed to the common man's sense of humor all the more because he was instinctively suspicious of those eloquent aristocrats and their new-fangled teachers.⁶

It is more difficult to understand why Plato or Aristotle should seek to misrepresent the scope of rhetoric and confine it to the courts. It will help us to understand their attitude if we can show that such misrepresentation was common in the fourth century. Now it is open to debate whether men like Thrasymachus and Lysias taught anything more than forensic oratory.⁷ Thus we cannot tell whether truth or slander is preserved in the charges that they trained future litigants. But it is unanimously admitted that Isocrates, although originally a *logographus* himself, later despised the writers of dicanic speeches and educated his pupils for the public and private life open to gentlemen.⁸ Therefore if we

ment than for instruction; cf. 2.44. Cleon, butt of Aristophanes' *Knights*, was not a poor tanner, it seems, but the son of a wealthy father (Wilamowitz, *Plato* 12.27).

⁶ Originally at least, it was mainly the upper classes at Athens who profited by the technical development of rhetoric, for only the rich could afford higher education. This class-distinction appears clearly in the Old Oligarch's *Const. Athens* 1.4-9. The lower classes are uneducated and ignorant (5). Answering the question why the right of speech is not confined to the cleverest and best men the author says that the good men would favor the interests of their own class (6; i.e. the oligarchs; cf. 1.13). Thus it seems clear that Cleon (Thuc. 3.37.3) alludes to the educated upper classes when he paradoxically asserts that clever men manage a city worse than humbler men. Diodotus answers with a defense of *εἰσβολία* (42.1, 44.1; Protagoras?). G. Walberer, *Isokrates und Alkidamas* (Hamburg, 1938) 13f., seems essentially right in maintaining that rhetoric was at first the tool of the aristocrats although demagogues soon picked up the new tricks from practical experience. Even before the Revolution of 411 many leaders of the people were from the upper classes according to Phrynichus, who feared their opposition to an oligarchy because they profited from the democracy (Thuc. 8.48.6).

⁷ But no dicanic orations are credited to Thrasymachus; Lysias wrote epideictic orations during the fourth century (at least an *Olympiacus*); cf. Walberer (note 6), 14, 20, 28, 33, 34, 39, and my paper (note 2), p. 141.

⁸ The goal of education: Isocrates says that the moral virtues of students are improved, [1.5], 13.21, 11.43, 9.75, 2.12, 15.84, 212, 275, 278, although some persons deny this, 3.1. He distinguishes the two kinds of *arete* in 12.183. All educators agree that the goal is good counsel, 2.51. This promise receives the usual formulation of good counsel for home and city in 15.285 and *epist.* 5.4 (cf. my paper cited in note 2, pp. 133-144). Rhetoric includes mental as well as oratorical training, 13.15, 3.8, 15.185, 277. A knowledge of politics is imparted, 10.5, 9, and statesmen are trained,

can find evidence that Isocrates or the φιλοσοφία⁹ that he represented was unfairly criticized by his contemporaries, then we can better understand similar charges against rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle. In this paper I propose to consider only the evidence preserved by Isocrates. At various times during his career he mentions criticism of himself and his rhetoric. His critics come from the people as well as from various professional groups.

In the earlier speeches Isocrates apparently is disturbed chiefly by the hostility of private citizens. His first publication as a teacher of rhetoric seems to have been the pamphlet, *Against the Sophists*.¹⁰ The opening sentence reveals that he wishes to establish better relations between the educators at Athens and the general public. The same interest pervades the pamphlet, which is not so much an accusation of his fellow-teachers as an exhortation to them all, whether dialecticians or rhetoricians, to mend their ways and to overcome the popular prejudice against higher education.¹¹

13.15, 15.185, 187, 204; epistle 4.2. And in 12.30-32 and 87 he begins to show a distaste for an active political career by preferring a gentlemanly ideal of good behavior in private life. See H. M. Hubbell, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius, and Aristides* (New Haven, 1913), 10-15, and H. Wersdörfer, *Die Φιλοσοφία des Isokrates im Spiegel ihrer Terminologie* (Leipzig, 1940).

⁹ It seems open to question whether the term philosophy was first applied to the pursuits of Socrates and his followers, or to Gorgias, or to the studies of the sophists and physicists in general and then later specialized to Plato and the other Socratics. For discussions of this point see H. v. Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* 11; W. Süß, *Ethos* (Leipzig, 1910) 81; Münscher, *RE s.v. "Isokrates,"* 2168.50; M. J. Milne, *A Study of Alcidas and his Relation to Contemporary Sophistic* (Bryn Mawr, 1924) 37; A. Gercke, "Die alte Τέχνη ῥητορική und ihre Gegner," *H* 32 (1897) 378; P. Natorp, "Platos *Phaedrus*," *H* 35 (1900) 393f.; W. Jaeger, *Die Antike* 4 (1938) 161. Wilamowitz, *Plato* 2².121, apparently thinks that rhetoricians were never called philosophers.

The evidence from Isocrates implies that teachers of oratory who taught only oratory were not usually called philosophers (see 15.268, 285; 10.2-3, 7; 15.50). But apparently the people would have called the rhetorician Gorgias a philosopher because of his paradoxical writings or because of his remarks on physics. Thus it seems that the word could originally have been applied to most early thinkers, just like the word sophist, and only after a long time did the two words—philosopher and sophist—come to signify two mutually contradictory schools. This specialization was not complete during Isocrates' life-time. He himself claims the word philosophy for rhetoric in the *Antidosis* (15.266, 270; cf. *Phaedr.* 278d) but elsewhere uses it to describe all education (2.51, 15.30, *epist.* 5.3). Probably *philosophia* originally described all higher studies whether or not taught in school, for all seemed paradoxical, but in Isocrates' time rhetoricians as composers of forensic and deliberative oratory were not usually called philosophers by anybody except themselves.

¹⁰ 15.194.

¹¹ This aspect of the pamphlet is usually neglected; likewise little is said about popular slander against Isocrates, e.g. Münscher (note 9), *passim*, but cf. Milne (note 9), 32.

At the same time Isocrates is eager to advertise his own educational program and to dissociate his school from the rest (11) while out-bidding his competitors by combining all the advantages that they offer and promising to prospective students the greatest possible improvement both in virtue and in oratorical and intellectual ability.¹²

In the beginning of his pamphlet Isocrates says that the public abuses the educators for excessive promises¹³ and considers their students more foolish than those who live in idleness.¹⁴ "Who would not hate and despise the teachers of eristic for their self-contradictions," he continues, apparently intending to condemn the professors of political oratory as well but tempering his language when he comes to his fellow-rhetoricians (9). Those emotions were actually felt by the citizens, for he concludes this section by saying (7-8) that some of the people rightly despise the dialecticians and call their study chatter and petty quibbling.¹⁵ When he discusses the teachers of political oratory he objects to their promises to train perfect statesmen as easily as ABC's are taught, not only because of the evil report which they themselves incur but also because they involve all the other more modest rhetoricians in the same disrepute (11).¹⁶ He believes that all prudent men would agree that many pupils remain in private life after school, whereas some untrained men have become successful politicians, a statement which suggests that the students' usual goal was a public career. So far, however, we have found in Isocrates evidence only of a popular scorn for teachers because of the quackery in education, an attitude familiar from his contemporary Plato but here including teachers who sought truth (1), taught ethics (6), and pretended to despise money (4).¹⁷ They are disliked by the public for promising more than they performed, not for teaching litigation.

¹² Literary ability is promised in Section 18; for the other abilities see note 8 above.

¹³ A common theme in Isocrates; cf. 13 *passim*; 15.147; 4.189.

¹⁴ In 15.286 he charges the Athenians with driving away the better young men from study to games, loafing, parties, and drinking-bouts, while the worse sort live in utter debauchery.

¹⁵ Hippias in *Hipp. ma.* 304A-E and Callicles in *Gorg.* 486c-D make a similar criticism of Socrates, but in *Euthyd.* 304E-305B the eristic of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus is the object of reproach. Evidently Plato himself was not unaware of popular hostility; cf. *Rep.* 487c-497A.

¹⁶ H. Raeder, "Alkidamas und Platon als Gegner des Isokrates," *RhM* 63 (1908) 499, says that the reproach comes from the people, not Alcidas as Gercke believed.

¹⁷ Usually taken as referring to Antisthenes rather than to Plato: Wilamowitz, *Plato* 2².109f.; Münscher (note 9), 2172.64, 2173.23-44. C. Barwick, however, *De*

One trace of a different feeling is preserved. In attacking the early technographers (19) Isocrates says that they picked the worst possible name for their subject, dicanic oratory, a name which should have been given to the subject only by men who envied the rhetoricians.¹⁸ He thereby suggests that even the earlier *technae* included more than forensic rhetoric since their contents need not have been described as dicanic oratory, but makes it clear that the rhetoricians and their pupils had enemies who envied them their ability and therefore belittled their studies by pretending that their object was petty litigation alone. Isocrates does not yet openly reveal that he personally has been the butt of this slander, although his *philosophia* is under attack; he records merely that he has suffered from the general scorn caused by some teachers' exaggerated claims (11).

Shortly afterwards Isocrates wrote to Polycrates a personal letter (11.2) which is called the *Busiris*. Although younger than Polycrates he considers himself more experienced and skilful (1 and 50), and after sympathizing with the poverty that forced Polycrates to become a teacher,¹⁹ he discusses his *Accusation of*

Platonis Phaedri Temporibus (Leipzig, 1913) 75, thinks that the search for truth refers to Plato.

¹⁸ This passage is examined in my paper (note 2), 149–151. Münscher (note 9), 2174.35, and W. Nestle, "Spuren der Sophistik bei Isokrates," *Phil.* 70 (1911) 10, think that Gorgias was among the writers of dicanic *technae*. Surely Gorgias did not teach litigation any more than Isocrates did. It is generally believed that neither wrote a *technē*. C. Reinhardt, *De Isocratis Aemulis* (Bonn, 1873) 5, considers that Tisias, Thrasyarchus, and Theodorus are meant and taught only dicanic oratory.

P. Natorp ("Platon Phaedrus," *H* 35 [1900] 392) urges as evidence for influence by the *Gorgias* on 13 that πολυπραγμοσύνη and πλεονεξία (13.20) are "bekannte Schlagworte des platonischen Gorgias gegen die politische Beredsamkeit." The noun πλεονεξία occurs there but once (508A) although the verb appears several times in the discussion of the question whether a man should seek to get more than his fellows. The other "Schlagwort" apparently is used only once and as a verb (526c). In no instance do they seem to refer to litigation as they do in Isocrates 13.

¹⁹ Walberer (note 6), 13–14, suggests an attractive hypothesis which could be developed to show that practical considerations forced each advance in Athenian rhetoric: Antiphon was the hidden director of the oligarchs; Lysias, Isocrates, and Polycrates lost their financial independence; Isocrates was bashful. Hence Walberer says that Antiphon did not originate rhetorical instruction because he had no need for money. But Antiphon was accused of teaching for hire (Περὶ τῆς Μεραστᾶς; cf. Plato *Menex.* 436A). Similarly Münscher (note 9), 2155.33–44, states that Isocrates and Lysias, who lost their fortunes in the Peloponnesian War, were the first to publish their speeches for display (cf. W. Aly, "Formprobleme . . .," *Ph. Suppl.* 21 [1929] 84). Publication for display, however, seems to have been used by Gorgias and the ancient sophists mentioned in Isocrates, 15.285, 268; 10.7. Isocrates says that other men wrote to show off their ability (10.8–9; 15.87; 12.263; *epist.* 1.6) or to demonstrate rhetorical

Socrates and his *Defense of Busiris* and demonstrates by detailed criticism, by general theory, and by example how to compose both a defense and an *encomium*. It has recently been asserted by Walberer²⁰ that Isocrates failed to distinguish these two different *genera* in the *Busiris* whereas in the *Helen* he carefully distinguishes between praise and defense and attacks the author of an earlier *Helen* for confusing the two different ideas (10.14). Walberer concludes that Isocrates' inconsistency reveals his lack of an established theory. True, in his preliminary witticism, that Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates* is a better apology than his *Apology for Busiris* (4-8), Isocrates does not yet distinguish *encomium* from defense, but this is because Polycrates had not done so and in order that Isocrates may find common ground for a comparison of the two speeches. But as soon as Isocrates turns to his own example (9) he promises to demonstrate the right methods for praise as well as for defense; and when the demonstration is complete he remarks that it would be possible to prolong both the praise and the defense but that he has already shown how to write each kind (τοῦτων ἐκάτερον). Not only does Isocrates distinguish the *genera* at the beginning and the end but he also discusses *Busiris* separately from each aspect and keeps the promised sequence: praise first; defense second. He lauds *Busiris* in Sections 10-29. Digressing in 30-35 he anticipates certain objections to his method of *encomium* and reproves Polycrates not only for accusing *Busiris* instead of defending him but also perhaps for failing to understand how to compose an *encomium* and for using the wrong *genus* (accusation-defense instead of praise-blame).²¹ After this interruption, which serves to divide the two halves of Isocrates' example, he sketches a defense for *Busiris* against the charge of killing strangers and criticizes the method of apologizing for crimes by referring to precedents for the crime.²² Thus it would seem that Isocrates' *Busiris* does not con-

techniques (11.44, 48) or to please an audience (12.1, 271). Naturally he himself aims more at benefiting his auditors by moral or political advice (4.17; 2.7). The same motives for writing probably existed in earlier times since Isocrates claims no monopoly on epideictic writings or displays of technique or good advice (2.3, 40-42).

²⁰ Walberer (note 6), pp. 10-11.

²¹ This may be the meaning. The crux is whether λουδοροῦντας here means "blame" (the opposite of praise) or "accuse" (the opposite of defend and a different *genus*). In Section 36 λουδοροῦντων clearly means "accuse," for it is repeated as κατηγοροῦσι. Wersdörfer (note 8), 49 and 67, apparently interprets the passage as I do.

²² This method of defense appears in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 1080: an adulterer can cite Zeus as his precedent; to judge from the context this method may have been a precept of the sophists whom Aristophanes has in mind.

tradict his *Helen* and that both show the same distinction between praise and defense.

In the last part of the *Busiris* (47–49) Isocrates appraises the value of such paradoxical *encomia*. It would be terrible, he says, if some pupil were persuaded to practise what Polycrates praised; even if the speech is intended to demonstrate the correct methods for handling disgraceful charges and a prejudiced audience yet Polycrates uses methods that are incorrect. He objects to both subject and treatment.

Isocrates' final point concerns the slander of his φιλοσοφία. He says that rhetoric is in vital danger and the victim of envy, using the same word for envy that appeared in his previous pamphlet (13.19). This suggests that the envy here mentioned expressed itself by calling the rhetoricians teachers of forensic oratory and that it was this charge of sycophancy which threatened the life of the schools because no parent would send his son to learn petty litigation. Isocrates adds that paradoxical *encomia* will increase the public hatred of rhetoric and that Polycrates is augmenting the disrepute of the whole profession (cf. 13.11).²³ Paradoxical *encomia* would support the popular contention that the sophists and rhetoricians make the worse case appear the better. Isocrates discusses that kind of writing more fully in the *Helen*. But in the *Busiris* he still fails to mention that he himself has been accused of teaching litigation, and says only that rhetoric was already disliked by the public and that paradoxes were an additional provocation.

In the *Panegyricus*, which was his first and most outstanding success, he alludes for the first time to a class of professional writers who object to the elaborate style of oratory and prefer a simple style even for epideictic oratory (4.11–12). These men use a simple style close to that of forensic oratory in their formal writings. So Walberer²⁴ may be right in considering this passage a reference to Lysias, who wrote an *Olympiacus* shortly before, or to his admirers and followers, rather than to Alcidas. Alcidas should not

²³ This sentence is incompletely translated by Münscher (note 9), 2179.5–7. He says that it is such shameful themes (paradoxes) which discredit rhetoric. But Isocrates said that such themes would discredit rhetoric even more than at present (*ἐτι μᾶλλον*). This shows that paradoxes were not the only reason for public dislike of the rhetoricians.

²⁴ Walberer (note 6), 55–60; usually identified as Alcidas; cf. Münscher (note 9), 2186.40. Wersdörfer (note 8), 130, is non-committal, but later (143) inclines to believe that Isocrates misrepresented Alcidas here.

be meant because his formal style was not simple. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.3) criticizes him for excessive elaborateness and bad taste in his formal productions. Probably Isocrates, Lysias, and Alcidas would all advocate a simple style for speeches in court or the assembly.²⁵ The point at issue is what style suits a formal oration or pamphlet. There Alcidas would probably agree with Isocrates, whereas Lysias perhaps advocated a simpler style. If so, Lysias is the opponent mentioned in the *Panegyricus*. The only objection which I can see to Walberer's explanation is that Lysias' *Epitaphius*, which he considers genuine, is written in an extremely elaborate style, and his *Olympiacus* does not lack adornment. Certainty is impossible in the absence of a statement by Lysias approving a simple style for all *genera*. Lysias is a more probable guess than Alcidas, but the most probable solution seems to be that neither Lysias nor Alcidas is referred to, but only some unknown admirers and imitators of the simple style for formal writing (cf. 12.1).²⁶ Modern scholars cannot hope to attach a name to every ancient allusion. Here in any case is the earliest criticism of Isocrates' style.

Later in the *Panegyricus* (47-50) Isocrates praises Athens as the inventor of his *philosophia* and describes the value of oratory, remarking that everybody desires this ability but envies its possessors. This one light touch reveals that he is still disturbed by envy and slander against all rhetoricians and their pupils.

The first full-dress defense of rhetoric against popular calumny appears in the strangest of places. Isocrates' third speech purports to be a formal lecture to his subjects by a monarch, Nicocles of Cyprus. The king begins by announcing that some persons²⁷

²⁵ Wersdörfer, p. 144, believes that some practical politicians used Isocrates' book-style. There must have been all shades of style in use, but even Isocrates' written symbuleutic speeches are simpler than his display pieces. I believe that it is best to distinguish only two main kinds of oratorical style for this period: practical and literary.

²⁶ A simple style like that of the logographers was used not only for practical deliberative oratory but also for some written compositions. See [Dem.] 61.2, where Wendland (*Anaximenes*, 73) ignores the references to written simple style.

²⁷ It seems inadvisable to insist as Münscher does (note 9), 2193.61-26, that Isocrates in his Preface must preserve the dramatic illusion and here refer to critics in Cyprus. Nicocles' citizens probably would not consider rhetoric as training for litigation, for the courts in Cyprus were not under popular control as at Athens but were presided over by the king (2.18; 15.40) and therefore less suited to dicastic rhetoric. As so often, Isocrates' *prooemium* is irrelevant and probably refers to popular abuse in general. The popularity of Greek teachers in Cyprus is noted in 9.50.

dislike oratory, blame students of it, and say that they strive for gain and not for virtue (3.1). The gain apparently meant is the profits of sycophancy and unjust litigation.²⁸ Nicocles now delivers a long lecture in defense of rhetoric before turning to domestic advice for the Cypriotes: people should blame students of right action rather than students of good speech since deeds bring more gain than words; all men practise religion and justice for the sake of gains and not losses; one should not blame good things themselves but the wrong use of them, whether it be the use of wealth, strength, courage, or oratory; oratory is the most valuable possession of man; so that men who dare to blaspheme against teachers and pupils deserve to be hated like those who outrage the altars of the gods. Strong language! It reveals how the popular insinuation that he taught petty litigation now rankled in the breast of Isocrates. The description of the value of rhetoric in this speech (5–9) is developed from a similar topic in the earlier *Panegyricus* (4.47–49) and reappears in the *Antidosis*.²⁹ In the *Panegyricus* only a passing reference was made to popular envy and πλεονεξία. In the *Nicocles* the theme of popular misrepresentation and πλεονεξία motivates the whole defense of rhetoric; it now seems clear that Isocrates has definitely been called a teacher of dicanic oratory.

A casual reference to misunderstanding by the people appears in Isocrates' letter to the children of Jason (6.5),³⁰ written ca. 358 B.C. He remarks that he has never prided himself on his epideictic speeches but on other things which have escaped the notice of the public. In this letter we hear for the first time of his imitators (7). He sees everybody else borrowing his ideas, and hence is willing to repeat a common-place that he originated and always tells his pupils: the writer's first task is to consider the purpose and function

²⁸ Paragraphs 2 and 3 suggest that litigation is meant since reference is made to crimes, deceit, injustice, and injury to others. Πλεονεξία is a standard word for unjust litigation in Isocrates; cf. 13.20; 12.1, 220, 243; and 15.281–284, which seems derived in part from 3.1–3 (see below). Sometimes it has a larger meaning. Xenophon (?), *Cyngeticus* xiii 10–18, discusses rhetoric as πλεονεξία and mentions both meanings.

²⁹ In Plato's *Gorgias* the praise of rhetoric (452b) and the distinction between the right and wrong use of rhetoric (457a) resemble Isocrates' arguments in this royal proclamation; see below. The second topic also reappears in 6.50 and 12.219, 223. The *Gorgias* seems to have been composed at about the same time as the *Nicocles* or shortly before, but the passages are too dissimilar to offer any proof that either borrows from the other. *Anon. Iambl.* (Diels⁹ 89, frag. 3) similarly notes that abilities should be used for good ends. *Gorgias, Helen*, praises the power of oratory.

³⁰ Letters 6 and 9 are called spurious by Münscher (note 9), 2202.41–2205.4.

of his speech and its parts.³¹ Shortly afterwards other imitators of Isocrates are mentioned in his letter to Archidamus (9.15)^{31a} as possible critics of Isocrates' intervention in Hellenic affairs. He says that they are uneducated themselves yet they promise to educate others, and that they dare to find fault with his writings although they are eager to imitate them.

We come now to Isocrates' longest speech, the *Antidosis*, published in 353 as a defense of his whole educational program. In it he mentions and answers in full the popular critics³² that are alluded to briefly in earlier speeches. In the first part he defends himself against specific accusations; in the last part he speaks as the champion of all the teachers of rhetoric (170) or of some of them (216).

First let us consider the actual charges brought by Lysimachus against Isocrates at his trial and repeated in his published defense (8). Lysimachus' *γραφή* said that Isocrates corrupted the young men by teaching them oratory and how to make unjust gains in the law-courts (30). In his accusation Lysimachus frequently charged Isocrates with using a written speech to prepare his defense (14) and asserted that he could make the worse cause appear to be the better one (15). He also discussed the power and skill of the defendant's oratory in general (5), which Isocrates took to be a charge that he was skilful at writing forensic speeches and thereby injuring fellow-citizens for his own profit (33-42). Isocrates says that these accusations of dicanic activity were intended to arouse anger and hatred (31), while Lysimachus tried to make the judges envious by mentioning his illustrious pupils and enormous wealth (31, 5, 40). The judges were perhaps more influenced by stories of his wealth and therefore forced him to assume the liturgy that he had tried to avoid. The decision may have been deserved, for

³¹ This method seems to be suggested in 2.2. *Phaedrus*, 237B, 263B, 264, 265B-E, discusses the function of a speech and its parts, and these passages are probably Platonic improvements on Isocrates since the *Phaedrus* is now considered definitely a later work; cf. P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), 549, Münscher (note 9), 2175.55-58, and Walberer (note 6), 1, 48-49. Gercke (note 9), 374 and *passim*, and other older scholars believed that the *Phaedrus* was early and therefore considered Isocrates the debtor. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1354b16-20, seems to allude to this technical precept of Isocrates and to explain its meaning further. He says that the precepts about the contents of the various parts of a speech tell only how to affect the judge, not how to prove a point.

^{31a} See note 30.

³² Isocrates' attempt to answer criticism by the public is ignored by Münscher (note 1), 2149.8 and 2208.21.

when seeking to disprove the existence of his alleged wealth Isocrates is rather brief (154–166) and not very convincing. But from Isocrates' point of view the accusation that he taught litigation was probably the most vexatious.

In this revised version of the defense it is criticism, not money, that disturbs him, especially the popular feeling against himself at this time (15.4, 163).³³ He distinguishes two classes among the jurors at the actual trial and among the public in general: first, those who are deceived and prone to believe the worst about him (4, 26, 28, 154); secondly, those who know the truth but envy him, feel as the sophists do about him, and rejoice to see the public deceived (4, 6, 142, 149, 153, 154). This second group is said to utter slander and blasphemy against him (28, 32, 37) and they probably should be identified with the group who would charge him with suppressing the many names of his forensic students (πολυπράγμονες 98; cf. 13.20). From the context it seems clear that these blasphemers, like those in the royal proclamation of Nicocles (3.9), called him a teacher of dicanic oratory (228). They are not sophists but resemble certain of them in this attitude towards himself.

Those two groups of critics from the people appear throughout Isocrates' long speech. They are carefully and ingeniously distinguished and kept in the foreground. When he turns to a general defense of rhetoric because he feels involved in the slander of his profession (168; cf. 3.1–9), the same two classes reappear as foes of rhetoric in general and are described in the same language as in Isocrates' personal defense. First there are the men who are not merely dissatisfied about instruction in oratory but also critical of everything else (168). Secondly comes the general public which is hostile towards rhetoric (168).

That second group is identified with the people who are simply mistaken (4) by the words, "many men of the better classes are

³³ F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1929) 218, believes that there was a sudden change in the public attitude towards Isocrates at this time and that this change resulted from Aristotle's beginning to lecture on rhetoric in school, where he attacked Isocrates. It may be doubted whether Aristotle was so influential then; Isocrates had long felt some public disapproval. By Solmsen's argument Aristotle's published *Gryllus* was less influential than his private lectures, which repeated the charges of the *Gryllus*. Solmsen also states that Lysimachus did not even repeat Aristotle's charge of δικογραφία. Certainly he accused Isocrates of teaching litigation, which is worse.

deceived about rhetoric and are therefore hostile towards it (243).'' Isocrates asks this group of intelligent laymen whether they think students sail from Sicily and Pontus to Athens merely in order to learn sycophancy (224); he criticizes them for giving the name of philosophy only to the admirers of the writings by the ancient sophists, as well as for disregarding practical education, believing the slander against it, and making the young men pass their days in dissipation rather than in the study of oratory (285-286). Isocrates expresses surprise at these men for admiring successful orators while blaming students of oratory; yet as Athenians they are in turn admired by the world for their own intellectual and oratorical qualities (291-293). Finally these intelligent and well-born critics of rhetoric are urged not to feel hostile or scornful but to persuade the young men of wealth and leisure to devote themselves to higher education instead of to idleness (304). Thus we find this group of upper-class Athenians referred to throughout the speech.³⁴ Isocrates does not specifically address the less-privileged citizens, perhaps because they could not afford rhetorical instruction for their sons. But he would consider that both groups have been deceived by malicious slander and indicates that even the better citizens believe rhetoric to be a school for litigation. This belief applies not only to the rhetoric of other teachers but also to Isocrates' own *φιλοσοφία*.

Yet these gentlemen form rather a passive group. Isocrates attacks the other group of popular critics more energetically since they are actively responsible for the slander against rhetoric. These are the men whom Isocrates charged with envy and blasphemy against himself at the beginning of his speech (4, 28). At the commencement of his defense for instruction in oratory he describes them as peevish about rhetoric and in the habit of criticizing everything else (168). Later these discontented (196) men are subdivided into two classes: first those who say that education is nonsense and a cheat (197, 199, 209); secondly those who admit that oratory can be taught but assert that the pupils are corrupted and plot against their neighbors' property (198, 215, 224, 236, 237, 240). The second group is said to blaspheme against rhetoric (228) and to consist of men like his accuser Lysimachus (236, 240). Apparently some of them are his mortal foes, the sycophants. In con-

³⁴ Walberer (note 6), 16, rightly stresses Isocrates' aristocratic attitudes and sympathies.

cluding this section Isocrates reunites these two groups by saying that they sneer and pretend that the students have been cheated until the students succeed, when they change their tune and say that the students have learned how to make unfair gains in court (247).

Thus we find that the popular criticism levelled against Isocrates and his *philosophia* in this speech is partly like the charges of Lysimachus; it accuses the rhetoricians either of cheating their pupils or of teaching their pupils to cheat the public. Isocrates has cleverly used this single theme of popular criticism to unite his introduction, personal defense, and defense of rhetoric. By skillfully subdividing and recombining the types of critics he has built the framework of his speech and given it a basic unity of theme.

A third group, professional critics, remains for discussion. In the Introduction Isocrates says that some of the sophists misrepresent his work outrageously (*βλασφημεῖν*) and assert that it concerns speech-writing for the law-courts (2).³⁵ He does not refer again specifically to this group as sophists, except in Section 4, where they are said to resemble the malicious popular critics. It seems unlikely that the sophists here mentioned can be fellow-teachers of oratory. The rhetoricians were either too busy defending themselves from the same charge or if anybody in Athens did teach dicanic oratory³⁶ he would not try to insult Isocrates in this way but would criticize his meddling in international politics, like the rivals in the ninth letter (15), or object to his impractical style, like the people in the *Panegyricus* (4.11). So we must look elsewhere, it seems, for the sophists that Isocrates has in mind.

Much later in the *Antidosis* we hear of another isolated group of professional opponents. Some of the men interested in eristic are said to misrepresent his pan-hellenic oratory outrageously, not out of ignorance but in hope of enhancing the appreciation of their own writings by slandering Isocrates (258). What was the nature of their misrepresentation? He only tells us that they called his speeches "quarrelsome" (260)³⁷ but this fact and the preceding

³⁵ This suggests Aristotle to Münscher (note 9), 2209.35, and Solmsen (note 33), 217.

³⁶ I have discussed the evidence from Isocrates for his fellow-rhetoricians and the scope of their instruction in a forthcoming paper.

³⁷ The passage reads: . . . *περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἡμεῖς ὄντες, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι (teachers of eristic) φασὶν εἶναι φιλαπεχθήμονας, πολὺ πρᾶότεροι τυγχάνομεν αὐτῶν ὄντες*. Isocrates takes the criticism as applying to him personally. If so, two interpretations

refutation of charges about forensic instruction are enough to suggest that this group joined in the common slander and called him a teacher of litigation. The same word for quarrelsomeness occurs in Sections 315 and 317 to describe sycophants. Combine the three traits of maliciousness, misrepresentation, and charges of litigiousness. It would seem clear that the teachers of eristic are the sophists mentioned in Section 4, for Isochrates mentions only two main classes of sophists—rhetoricians and dialecticians (13,2.51)—and the rhetoricians would not accuse him of teaching litigation. Thus the same critics appear in Sections 4 and 258.

The teachers of eristic who, he says, were always criticizing him unfairly (260) seem certainly to be Plato or his followers, for he goes on to discuss the value of dialectic and the special sciences; cf. Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* (484c). His discussion probably is an allusion to the curriculum of the Academy.³⁸ Possibly Isocrates has taken as a reference to himself the passage which appeared long before in Plato's *Euthydemus* where the critic of eristic display is said to be wise in law-court speeches (304d) and to write speeches for professional litigants (305b). I should prefer to believe that Plato did not have Isocrates definitely in mind, for the remarks seem too cruel a misrepresentation of his activity as a teacher.³⁹ But Isocrates appears again to allude to this dialogue when he reverses the charge there (305d) and says that the teachers of eristic slander him in order to enhance their own writings (258).

are possible: (1) his epideictic and deliberative speeches are called full of personal attacks on his rivals; (2) Isocrates is called a sycophant and a writer of dicanic rather than political speeches. I prefer the second interpretation since it accords with the context and with the usual attitude of Plato towards rhetoric, although this remark may not have been directed against Isocrates in particular; cf. note 39.

³⁸ Münscher (note 9), 2211.43–50, says that the discussion of education is an allusion to the Platonic philosophy; cf. R. Robinson (*Plato's Earlier Dialectic* [Ithaca, 1941] 92), who has written a significant discussion of the relation between eristic and dialectic (88–92). Solmsen (cf. note 33) believes that Aristotle was already lecturing at Athens, and is here included.

³⁹ Münscher, 2184.59–66, Shorey (note 31), 34 and 167, Blass, 2^o.35, Barwick (note 17), 75–76, R. Flacelière, "L'Éloge d'Isocrate à la fin du Phèdre," *REG* 46 (1933) 225, and W. Kroll, *RE s.v.* "Rhetorik" (separately printed 1937), 17.62, consider this to be a specific reference to Isocrates although the detail that the critic is said to have written speeches for litigants is usually disregarded. Their main support is Crito's remark (*Euthyd.* 305c) that the critic has never appeared in the law-courts. This is supposed to allude to the lack of nerve that kept Isocrates from making public speeches (12.9–10). It seems doubtful whether this defect would be well known at such an early date. Furthermore, Isocrates taught forensic oratory only incidentally, if at all, and while other details in *Euthyd.* 305c–e may fit him they can apply to others too.

So it is probable that Isocrates considers Plato guilty of saying that he taught litigation. He may also be answering attacks by Aristotle.

The discussion of the eristic critics is in a noteworthy context. Before examining the value of dialectic Isocrates described the value of rhetoric and the need for right use of it (251–257); after the section treating dialectic (258–269) and the question whether dialectic or rhetoric should be called philosophy (270–280) he discusses the word *πλεονεξία* and argues that it should not be used to describe the petty gains of sycophancy (281–284). The three themes of gain, right use, and the value of rhetoric have been developed here from a shorter and unified treatment of those themes in Nicocles' proclamation (3.1–9), which in turn was an expansion of a similar passage in the *Panegyricus* (4.47–50). The original treatment in the *Panegyricus* simply alludes to *πλεονεξία* (*πλεονεκτήσαντες* 48) and right use (*καλῶς χρωμένους* 49) without further discussion, but it dwells upon the value of rhetoric.⁴⁰ All three passages use the same materials.

That earlier discussion of the themes makes it probable that Isocrates in the *Antidosis* is not completely dependent upon Plato's *Gorgias* (456D) when he incidentally uses the same terms as Gorgias in arguing that a teacher is not responsible for the wrong use of his subject (*ὀπλομαχεῖν, πυκτεύειν, παγκρατιάξαι*). Nor are Plato and Isocrates both deriving their ideas directly from Gorgias as Süss would argue,⁴¹ for Isocrates clearly shows an independent development of the ideas in his three speeches, and even returns to the topic that Athens is the school for Greece in the *Antidosis* (295–297), which he first discussed in the *Panegyricus* immediately after the three-fold unit (50). Perhaps Isocrates in the *Antidosis* also has Plato's treatment of his own arguments in mind and so not only echoes some of Plato's phrases but while the philosopher is still fresh in his mind immediately answers Plato's supposed attacks on himself before completing his development of the three elements in

⁴⁰ F. Solmsen, "Drei Rekonstruktionen zur antiken Rhetorik und Poetik," *H* 67 (1932), 151–154, discusses a similar claim for poetry in Horace, *A.P.* 391–407.

⁴¹ Süss (note 9) derived the common elements in Plato, Alcidas, and Isocrates from Gorgias, whereas Walberer (note 6) defends Isocrates' priority; Milne (note 9) and Gercke (note 9), 364, 381, argue that Alcidas is the original thinker. The late dating of the *Phaedrus* seems to have settled this problem; Alcidas probably wrote still later, as Walberer maintains, and the dates for his activity as a teacher need reconsideration.

the topic by discussing *πλεονεξία*. His explanation of the right use for rhetoric recalled Plato's remarks on the subject and perhaps caused him to borrow a few words. Then he digressed in order to answer Plato's attacks on rhetoric before returning to the third idea which he had used in the *Nicodes*. Thus Isocrates seems to be independent of Plato when he discusses the value and right use of rhetoric, themes which also appear in Plato's *Gorgias*. Although Plato complimented him in the *Phaedrus* and borrowed some of his ideas about rhetoric,⁴² yet Isocrates feels personally insulted by Plato's imputations that the rhetoricians taught litigation and therefore replies to him in the *Antidosis*. Apparently the philosophers shared and augmented the public misrepresentation of rhetoric as a school of sycophancy.

In the *Philippus* (5.11) there appears a brief reference to the slander of Isocrates by professional rhetoricians. At first sight these do not seem to be the same as the teachers in the ninth letter (15) who objected to his concern for the misfortunes of Greece and themselves wrote on petty themes, whereas the men in the *Philippus* are said to disparage him but to imitate and praise his *Panegyricus*. But these groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive and we shall discuss them again below. Perhaps the group of the *Philippus* is mentioned in the *Antidosis* (15.61–62), where the same word for "disparage" is used and the *Panegyricus* is similarly praised.⁴³ The critics in the *Antidosis* are called incapable of writing anything worthy of mention themselves although they disparage other men's labors. They will say that Isocrates' *encomium* of Athens' past in the *Panegyricus* is nicely written but will be too grudging to say that it is well written, and they prefer more useful kinds of writing. Here we have professional criticism of Isocrates' choice of subject and style. Other potential critics were mentioned in *Helen* 29–30 and 12.84. Those in 5.11 seem to be the same as the men in 15.63.

The feeling of the people against Philip is compared with their attitude towards Isocrates in his letter to Philip (2.22). He says that he is misunderstood and envied by the majority of the people

⁴² See notes 31 and 48.

⁴³ Münscher (note 9), 2188.54, considers this an allusion to Plato and the remarks in *Republic* 426E. But the word *χάρις* is played with from 426A on, and the allusion is probably to demagogues, not to Isocrates; Plato could scarcely be said (15.62) to prefer speeches which correct present mistakes and give advice for the future. The identity of these critics is discussed in note 45.

and by those who judge men carelessly. Philip is envied for his successes, Isocrates for his alleged wisdom and many pupils.

The *Panathenaicus* was Isocrates' last speech and appeared in 339 when he was ninety-seven. Again as in the *Antidosis* the old man utters a pathetic cry against his critics and their malicious slander (12.9, 21). We hear again of the public which has been deceived (5, 6) and which envies him because of his ability (15, 23), but we do not hear of deliberate malicious slander by ordinary people as in the *Antidosis* (4). Here the calumny all comes from professional teachers, and Isocrates reveals only by implication that he is called a teacher of litigation (5).

These professional critics seem to fall into three classes. First there are the inglorious and villainous sophists whose slander and misrepresentation are not specified but appear to be the old charge of litigation (5, 6).⁴⁴ Then we hear of some men who strive to imitate Isocrates (16). The use of the same phrase (μιμείσθαι γλιχομένων; cf. 12.156) suggests that these are the same imitators as in the ninth letter (15). This group in 12 is said to be more hostile to Isocrates than the private citizens although they have less theory to impart than he has and keep alive only by using his speeches as examples for their pupils. They misinterpret the speeches and pull them to pieces. These critical imitators are mentioned again in Section 263. Isocrates' oligarchical pupil and subtle adviser says that publication of the *Panathenaicus* will grieve those who admire his writings most but attack his speeches when they appear before crowds at *panegyreis* in hopes of rivaling him; they put their auditors to sleep while trying to deceive them (paradoxical *encomia*? cf. 10.8). The language of this passage resembles Section 135, which therefore can perhaps be used to identify those imitators more precisely. There Isocrates has just promised a discussion of the virtues of Athens in the past and fears that some will consider it too long.⁴⁵ He says that these persons do not like serious (cf. 11.9) writing but abuse it at *panegyreis* or else deliver an *encomium*

⁴⁴ It seems impossible to identify these men.

⁴⁵ This passage is reminiscent of the *Antidosis* (62), where he said that some of his critics, poor writers themselves, will not like his *encomium* of Athens' past, which he has quoted from the *Panegyricus*, but will prefer other subjects. Apparently the same men are indicated in both these passages (15.62 and 12.135) and they once criticized that section of the *Panegyricus* before it was repeated in the *Antidosis*. Therefore Isocrates feels that he can predict their future reaction to any *encomium* of Athens.

of the vilest objects or the most lawless men in the world. Both groups (12.263 and 135) attack serious writing at *panegyreis*.

The description of their *encomia* might apply to Alcidas, who wrote a laudation of Death, or to Polycrates, who praised Busiris, Clytaemnestra, mice, pots, and pebbles.⁴⁶ But Polycrates was older than Isocrates (11.50) and both he and Alcidas were probably dead by this time, although little is known about their dates. There may have been others who represented the same love of paradoxical *encomia*. This group also appears in Sections 271–272, and probably in 155. Isocrates would consider their subjects petty and unimportant compared with his own (11.9, 10.8–10), yet these men admired some of his speeches. So the imitators in the *Philippus* (5.11), as well as those in the ninth letter (15) and the *Antidosis* (62), apparently belong to this group of paradoxical writers, especially since immediately after mentioning them in the *Philippus* Isocrates sneered at their troubling crowds at the *panegyreis* with discourses as ineffectual as the laws and constitutions written by sophists (5.12). The connecting links are admiration and imitation of Isocrates combined with attacks on him and petty *epideixeis* at *panegyreis* and elsewhere. We find that some of his rival rhetoricians are described as writers of epideictic speeches and that the same men reappear several times. They are the second group in the *Panathenaicus*.

The third group of detractors are said to be common sophists who sit in the Lyceum (18, 33). They are rhapsodes of poetry and pretend to know everything and to get everywhere quickly (?). A friend of Isocrates heard them reciting from the poets and repeating other men's remarks about the poets (?). The description recalls Plato's rhapsode, *Ion*.⁴⁷ One of them said that Isocrates despised the study of the poets and criticized all other forms of education except his own (19, probably meaning rhetoric in general). A similar remark appears at the beginning of Alcidas' pamphlet. In 12 it occasions a discussion of education by Isocrates (26–33) like the passage in *Antidosis* 258–269 but including oratorical ability. Here is the first indication in Isocrates that rival schools of education resented his attacks on them and accused him of

⁴⁶ See Münscher (note 9), 2177.65.

⁴⁷ These petty sophists are called followers of Plato by Münscher (note 9), 2217.49. It seems inadvisable to press these references too hard, although a contemporary would probably have recognized the allusion.

rejecting the traditional education in the poets as well as all other studies except rhetoric.

We have found abundant evidence that Isocrates considered himself and his *philosophia* to be the object of much criticism. He warns his colleagues to refrain from making excessive promises and writing paradoxical *encomia* in order to stop the general hostility against rhetoric which is affecting him personally. He mentions some criticism by professional rivals of his style and his choice of subjects. Other teachers who apparently specialize in poetry charge him with destroying all other forms of education except his own. But the most common and the most unfair slander against Isocrates is the assertion that his business was teaching pupils how to cheat their opponents in court. Lysimachus even adds the stock charge that he corrupted the youth and made the worse cause appear the better; and accusations that he was a teacher of litigation come from all sides, from the educated public, from the sycophants and malicious elements in Athens, and from the teachers of eristic. Isocrates' own speeches testify to the falsity of this common slander and show him as an anxious, high-minded, and industrious teacher of statesmanship, elegant prose, and gentlemanly accomplishments.

While presenting this evidence of slander against Isocrates we have reached a few other conclusions. The purpose of his first pamphlet (13) was to improve the relations between teachers and public as well as to advertise his own extensive program and promises. Isocrates distinguishes between praise and defense in the *Busiris* as in the *Helen*. Walberer's theory that Lysias is alluded to in the *Panegyricus* is attractive, but I think that his admirers are meant rather than Lysias himself. The theme of criticism is the organizing principle in the *Antidosis*. The teachers of eristic in that speech seem to be Plato and his followers. Nor does Isocrates appear to be dependent on Plato for the discussion of the right use of rhetoric. And finally we have discussed the critical imitators of Isocrates in 5.11; 12.16, 135, 155, 271-272, 283; 15.62; and epistle 9.15, and found some evidence that they all belong to the same group and were writers of paradoxical *encomia* in the manner of Polycrates. Thus some of his rivals do not confine themselves to deliberative or forensic oratory but are notorious for *epideixeis*.

Let us now return to the larger question about the ancient statements that the rhetoricians were mere teachers of law-court chicanery. It has been established, I think, that this misrepresentation was common in the fourth century, and that although there may have been some teachers who deserved the reproach yet it is remarkable that such charges would be levelled against a teacher like Isocrates. Therefore I am forced to suspect that Plato⁴⁸ and Aristotle⁴⁹ are to some extent deliberately misrepre-

⁴⁸ The relations between the Platonic and Isocratean schools are discussed by A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.* (see note 39) 318f., and Wilamowitz, *Plato* 2².106–125; both conclude that the leaders were on fairly good terms with each other. Their views are opposed by W. Jaeger, *Gnomon* 4 (1928) 7, and Solmsen (note 33), 196–221, who discusses the problem exhaustively. R. L. Howland, "The Attack on Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*," *CQ* 31 (1937) 151–159, not content with considering Isocrates only one of the many rhetoricians there attacked, even finds Isocrates lurking behind the name of Lysias (p. 155) and supposes *Phaedrus*' ignorance of other than forensic and deliberative oratory (261b) to be a reference to Isocrates' views, although Plato seems to indicate Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus as his source. The introduction to the *Helen* (esp. 14) reveals that Isocrates already recognized and gave instruction for writing more kinds than deliberative or forensic oratory (cf. *Busiris*); later he suggests an extensive classification for the *genera* of prose literature (15.45–46; 12.1–2; cf. my paper on "Isocrates' Genera of Prose," *AJPh* 64 [1943] 427–431). I think that the *Phaedrus* is not primarily against Isocrates although some of the criticisms apply to him. Plato, while improving some Isocratean doctrines, attacks both earlier and contemporary rhetoric.

⁴⁹ Aristotle's polemical statements lead to impossible contradictions, if accepted at their face-value. In *Rhetoric* 1368a20–21, he admits that Isocrates was unused to *δικολογεῖν* (despite Wendland, *Anaximines* 59). His Introduction, however, gives the impression that no deliberative oratory was taught. Yet Isocrates had the largest and most influential school at that time (15.41); cf. my paper (note 2).

Walberer (note 6), p. 32, offers an ingenious explanation of Aristotle's errors about rhetoric. He believes that Aristotle was personally unacquainted with the actual situation at Athens and made false conclusions from Isocrates' writings. In this way he explains the errors in Cicero, *Brut.* 48: from 13.9–10, Aristotle allegedly inferred that Lysias taught only before he became a *logographus* (Walberer applies 13.9–10 to Lysias); from Isocrates' hatred of logographers in the *Antidosis* although originally one himself, Aristotle allegedly concluded that Isocrates had abandoned forensic activity because he became involved in unpleasant lawsuits; this experience gave him a pathological hatred for logographers (but the law mentioned by Cicero is apparently Roman!).

But I cannot believe that Aristotle, collector of sources and pupil of Plato, had to depend on Isocrates for information about the history of rhetoric or that he could not understand his sources as well as we can. It seems wiser to blame Cicero or his sources for the mistakes in the *Brutus*; cf. Walberer, p. 33, and my paper, "Corax and the Prolegomena," *AJPh* 64 (1943) 11–15. The charge in the *Rhetoric* that Aristotle's predecessors taught only litigation certainly ignores Isocrates completely and conveys the wrong impression about rhetorical instruction; cf. Blass, 2².66.

Can we escape the contradiction by saying that Aristotle did not refer to oral instruction or incidental precepts in written speeches? Granted that Aristotle, strictly

senting contemporary rhetoric and sharing in the rivalry between schools that Isocrates describes in the *Antidosis* (147). "The public sees all the educators except those who approve of Isocrates' life and manner (i.e. his pupils⁵⁰) giving displays in the *panegyreis* and in private gatherings, competing with each other excessively, making promises, quarrelling, abusing, omitting no evil, and causing trouble for themselves while giving the opportunity to their audiences to laugh at some of them, to praise a few, and to hate most of them."

taken, means only written treatises on rhetoric, granted that there were no technographers after 390, when they were mentioned in Isocrates, 13, yet to say the least it was unfair of Aristotle to write that only forensic *technae* existed and to pass over in utter silence the fact that the largest school of rhetoric in Athens was devoted not merely to deliberative oratory but to even larger pan-hellenic subjects and produced historians and poets as well as statesmen and generals. And who will grant that no *technae* were written under Isocrates' influence and before the *Rhetoric*? It seems humanly impossible that any student of Isocrates could compose a purely dicanic *technē* after reading his master's speeches. Therefore it seems wise not to use Aristotle's silence about deliberative *technae* as an argument against the existence of earlier treatises by Isocrates or Anaximenes (e.g. Blass, 2².106; P. Hamberger, *Die rednerische Disposition* . . . (Paderborn, 1914) 16, note 1).

Thus Aristotle's charges in the Introduction that there was no training for the assembly or in argumentation should not be explained by saying that they were retained from an earlier edition of the *Rhetoric*, as is done by Milne (note 9), 52, and Wendland, *Anaximenes* 36 note 2. Solmsen (note 33), 217 note 1, courageously accepts the implications of Aristotle's charges for Isocratean *technae*, although later (220) he calls the charges "fast unsachlich." Certainly Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*, which shows in writing that different ideals existed, is too early for any edition of the *Rhetoric* or the *Theodecteia*. Yet it is not mentioned. Let us face what seem to be the facts: misrepresentation and petty criticism were a common practice of both rhetoricians and philosophers in the fourth century; cf. Walberer, 38-39. Charity to the enemy was not a Greek virtue.

⁵⁰ Walberer (note 6), 55, considers this an allusion to Plato and his praise of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*. Thus Isocrates would testify that Plato was not engaged in the rivalry of the schools. But elsewhere in this speech (258) Isocrates apparently attacks him as a vociferous rival. The context at this point permits no suspicion that Plato was present in his mind, and there is no need for such subtlety. Ἀγαπάω seems to have the same technical meaning of adherents to a sect that we find in 15.88, 151, and 285. Pupils are said to imitate his manner in *epist.* 8.10. So pupils are meant in 15.147.